Because agricultural production takes place over space, the availability and cost of transport are important in determining the location and level of agricultural output. Although rural transport may be viewed as one of many inputs to agricultural production, its role can be modeled more precisely than simply as another factor of production in a neoclassical production function. In this paper, I shall build on the important work of Walters (1968, chap. 5' on the Ellet model to develop a framework that explicitly uses information about the technology of transportation and the associated geographical pattern of production in the agricultural sector.' In this way, the effects of price interventions on government's revenues and on producers' decisions and welfare can be seen to derive from their impact on the spatial structure of agricultural activity.
While this type of explicit modeling of agriculture and transportation is important for evaluating tax policies, especially when these influence the cost of transportation, it is really essential in considering state marketing schemes. Only in this type of model can one analyze the effects on government revenues and producer welfare of spatially dispersed buying depots run by state agencies. Among the aspects of depots are the effects of their numbers, their locations, the prices paid at them, and the movement of output past depots toward or away from the point of export (forwardhauling and backhauling, respectively).
Different price policies require getting out into the countryside to contact producers to different degrees. Some policies have the advantage that they can be enforced exclusively from the point of export. Other interventions imply a direct presence in the countryside, by either tax authorities or marketing agencies. Another important advantage of a spatially oriented model of agriculture and price interventions is, therefore, the ability to think about the relative advantages of different price policies in these terms. Tax administration is often entirely neglected in the theory of public finance, and it is I adopt Walters's basic model in Secs. II and III. The main difference in assumptions in these sections is that Walters assumes that output per acre is a constant, so that there is no intensive margin of cultivation, and therefore all elasticity in behavior derives from changes in the boundary of cultivation, the extensive margin of cultivation. He analyzes a wide range of issues not touched on by me: a truncated road, road sections of different quality, two-way traffic, inelastic demand for output, movement of off-road transport in all directions, and feeder roads, all topics of importance to the assessment of road projects and public finances in an explicitly spatial framework. On the other hand, Walters considers only the maximization of revenues with respect to either export taxes or transport taxes but does not discuss the optimal combination of these two instruments or the optimal tax problem. Nor does he look at any aspects of marketing, as discussed here in Secs. IV and VI. There are also some analogies between my analysis and the literature on spatial monopoly, which I comment on as they arise. valuable if something can be said about the costs of implementing various price policies. An explicitly spatial analysis helps to do this.
Sections II and III of the paper describe the behavior of individual farmers and the general equilibrium of the agricultural sector as a whole. Section IV analyzes various aspects of state marketing when purchases are made at a continuum of depots. Section V discusses price interventions that are conventionally termed taxes and subsidies on exports and on transport, as well as combinations of these instruments, and compares these policies with the state marketing scheme of Section IV. Section VI returns to the question of state marketing, but when only a discrete number of depots is feasible. Section VII discusses panterritorial pricing, a frequently adopted policy in Africa that seeks to provide all producers with the same farm gate price regardless of their location. Section VIII summarizes the major findings and suggests priorities for further research.
II. Equilibrium of the Smallholder in the Countryside
The smallholder in this economy makes choices about production in a very straightforward way, by maximizing rents per acre, ir(x, y), on land located at the point (x, y). He does so by varying the amount of a single input, labor, which he applies at the rate of L(x, y) per acre. He pays this labor a wage per unit of $w, which does not depend on location, and he takes this wage as exogenously given. This wage is also given exogenously at the level of the export sector as a whole, which is small relative to the entire economy. Output per acre, Q(x, y), depends on labor input as specified by a standard neoclassical production function, F, with F' > 0 and F" < 0:
Output is sold where it is produced at a farm gate price of $k(x, y), so that rents, -a, per acre at location (x, y) are given by
The maximization of rents by farmers then implies the standard condition: Figure 1 illustrates the economic geography of the countryside. A road going through land of equal fertility is perpendicular to a straight coastline that it meets at a port, from which agricultural output is exported to world markets. The port is denoted as the origin of the diagram. Every unit of output that is transported to the port is purchased there by foreigners at a fixed price of $p*. Export of output from the location (x, y) requires two types of travel, from (x, y) to the road, at a cost of $b per ton-mile, and along the road to the port, at a cost of $a* per ton-mile measured in world prices. Off-road transport may literally involve the headloading of produce to the road or, alternatively, travel by bullock cart or some other simple means of transport. Traditional transport is distinguished economically from modern mechanized transport along the road (by truck or railroad) in two ways: (1) It is much more expensive (i.e., a* << b). For this reason, I assume that off-road transport occurs only in the direction that is perpendicular to the road for a distance of y miles and that the then remaining distance of x miles is on the road.2 (2) While on-road transport can be taxed (or subsidized) by the government via fuel and truck taxes or the freight rates implicit in the locational prices paid by state marketing agencies, traditional transport cannot be and is therefore an untaxed good. This distinction embodies the notion that the government cannot get out everywhere in the countryside at will.
In the absence of any government intervention, the farm gate price is assumed to be given by the difference between the world price at the port, p*, and the costs of transportation to the port: k(x,y) = P*-a*x -by.
2 For instance, Squire (1973) shows that for some data from the Thai rice trade, which give a value for traditional transport 10 times that of mechanized transport, the cost-minimizing angle of off-road travel is 84? to the road. Similarly, Mears (1981, p. 217) reports data for the Indonesian rice trade that suggest a ratio of b to a* of from 10 to one to perhaps as high as 30 to one. In these cases, the assumption of perpendicular travel is not a bad approximation. What can be said about the boundary of cultivation, the locus beyond which there is no production for export through the port? Certainly, no production occurs beyond the point at which k(x, y) = 0. If F' --oc as L --0, cultivation occurs right up to this line, and similarly for the special case used by Walters in which F = 1, so that production per acre is a constant and requires no labor at all. On the other hand, if a strictly positive amount of labor per acre is needed to produce anything at all, the boundary lies inside the locus k(x, y) = 0. Throughout the paper, I assume that technology is such that the boundary of cultivation is given by k(xy) = 0.
IV. State Marketing and Government Revenues: A Continuum of Depots
Analytically, the policy of state marketing with a continuum of depots represents the greatest flexibility among policies that I consider to be at all economically feasible, and therefore it is a good starting point. 3 Taxes on land that vary with location embody even greater flexibility; however, this type of tax involves getting out into the countryside to a very great extent. If the government could implement such a tax, it could obtain the absolutely highest level of revenue equal to all rents in the economy when the government does not intervene at
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In subsequent sections, I look at the consequences of further constraining government policies.
There are obvious similarities between taxation and the government's arrogation to itself of the exclusive right to purchase from farmers through a state marketing agency. The two types of policies can always be made definitionally identical because any difference between world prices (net of transport costs) and prices paid by the state can be termed a tax. Thinking in terms of state marketing, however, suggests pricing alternatives not conventionally termed taxation. In particular, state marketing calls to mind notions of physically getting out into the countryside to influence farm gate prices.
One state marketing policy is line of road (or rail) purchase. All output from (x, y) that is brought y miles to the road x miles from the port is purchased at the point (x, 0) at price p(x), which can vary with X.4 In this case, the net price that farmers receive (the farm gate price) is k(x,y) = p(x) -by.
The equation 
Equations (8) and (9) embody the assumption that all output produced along the line between (x, 0) and (x, p (x)/lb) is sold at point x for price p(x) rather than elsewhere along the road, say at x for price p(x). For the present, I maintain this assumption, which may be justified in practice by governmental restrictions on the movement of goods on the road by anyone other than the marketing agency. At the end of this section, I discuss (1) whether the schedule of prices determined under this assumption would in fact lead to private incentives to move goods along the road, thereby undermining this price schedule if such movement is not prohibited; (2) whether the government would do better by allowing farmers to move along the road if they wish to; and (3) how to modify the price schedule derived under the assumption that movement by farmers is prohibited when this schedule provides incentives to movement that cannot, in actuality, be prohibited.
The maximization of HI subject to R = R with respect to the pattern of prices, p(x), is an optimal control problem with an integral constraint. The solution is given by setting to zero the derivative of H(x) = 7T(x, *) + ,ur(x, ) with respect to p(x), with ,u a constant independent of x but dependent on R. After some algebraic rearrangement, it can be shown that
2 dp ( dT (x-) + ~Ldr(x,) -(11) dp(x) dp(x) if private welfare (land rents) is maximized subject to a revenue constraint, and equation (1Oa) Backhauling.-Any incentive to farmers to move output along the road calls into question the feasibility of such marketing schemes. By backhauling I mean that there is an incentive to move output from x0 to xl > x0 when such transport can be arranged at a* per ton-mile. It involves the marketing agency's having to move output back over the same part of the road that the output has just traversed. Other things equal, backhauling is obviously socially inefficient because the agency could pay p (xi) at xo and the agency and farmers at x0 would each gain a*(xl -x0) in transport costs. Backhauling also undermines the optimality of the p(x) since they were calculated on the assumption of no backhauling. If backhauling is to be privately profitable, dpldx must be positive. (Although this condition is necessary, it is not sufficient.) The second-order conditions for the government's constrained maximization problem ensure, however, that the denominator of equation (12a) must be negative. If the second-order condition holds, then dpldx < 0, and therefore backhauling is ruled out.
Forwardhauling.-Forwardhauling occurs if farmers move output from x; to x <_x, something that has been ruled out by assumption up to this point. For farmers to find it profitable to forwardhaul, the benefits from the increased price, p(xi) -p(xj), must exceed the additional transport costs, a*(xj -xi). If the p(x) are smooth, then this condition is equivalent to dp(x)ldx < -a* for some x.
' hat is, if the government does not want to induce forwardhauling, it must choose a schedule that obeys dp(x)ldx --a* everywhere. Forwardhauling raises two questions: (1) If the government were to permit forwardhauling, might the government not be able to improve its performance? In figure 2, p(x) has one interval of forwardhauling, by farmers at any x such that xi < x xj. All these farmers between x-and xi forwardhaul to xi. They receive a net-of-transport price p (xi) -a*(-x) given by the dashed line BC tangent to p(x) at B with slope -a*. These prices exceed the prices from staying put, fi(R), given by the solid curve connecting B and C.
While p(x) involves forwardhauling, there always exists another price schedule p(x) that achieves the same values of the only outcomes that matter to the farmers and the government, the R, H, and ar(x, y), and that involves no forwardhauling. The second price schedule /P(x) is obtained by construction from the first as follows: For all points xi and x with x, < x ' xj from which there is forwardhauling to xi, replace p(R) by p(R) = p(x2) -a*(R -x).
Otherwise, let p/(x) = p(x). That is, p(x) follows p(x) between A and B and between C and D but follows the dashed line BC rather than the curve between B and C. Farmers are now just indifferent between selling at xi and selling at any x, and it can be assumed that they sell at each x the amount produced there at price p(s).
The old fi(x) and the new p(x) schedules are equivalent in all economically relevant respects. In particular, the boundary of cultivation under p(x) is the same as that under p(x) because the land with zero rent at any x is located such that p(x)-a*(x -x )-by = 0 in either case. The government is also indifferent. In particular, it raises the same amount of revenue from farmers whose land is along the vertical through any x in figure 1, after paying a lower price for their output, p(x) rather than fi(x.), but paying correspondingly more in transport costs. The values of all the economically relevant variables, the R, HI, and 7T(x, y), are therefore the same under the schedules 3(x) and /(x). That is, the government can always choose a schedule without forwardhauling that does as well as any schedule that involves forwardhauling, so that it loses nothing by prohibiting forwardhauling. That farmers have the option to forwardhaul does, however, impose a constraint on the price schedules that the government can choose, namely that these schedules cannot have dp(x)ldx < -a*.' Otherwise farmers will forwardhaul, which, as has just been proved, is equivalent in terms of R, H, and uT(x, y) to some price schedule with dp(x)ldx --a*. This in turn implies that giving the option of forwardhauling to farmers can never increase the choices available to the government; the government can always choose a price schedule that does not involve forwardhauling (the p(x)) that is equivalent to one that does (the p(x)).
The strategy for calculating the optimal price schedule therefore involves three steps: (1) Use equation (11) to calculate the optimal p(x), disregarding the constraint imposed by forwardhauling. (2) Check from equation (12a) that dp(x)ldx > -a*; if so, the forwardhauling constraint is not binding and the optimal p(x) are correctly 1 123 determined by equation (11). Because (pu -l)/p > 0, dp(x)ldx --a* is equivalent to -q ' 1, a condition that is satisfied for many production functions including Cobb-Douglas. If dp(x)ldx < -a* anywhere along the price schedule given by equation (11), then the prices given by equation (1 1) are not sustainable in the absence of a physical prohibition of forwardhauling. In this case, a third step is then necessary. (3) The price schedule must be rederived by maximizing 11 subject to a constraint on R and the constraint dp(x)ldx ? -a*.8 Note that when the government maximizes private welfare subject to a revenue constraint and dp(x)/dx --a* is binding, private welfare is lower than if forwardhauling could be prohibited. This outcome occurs because, by assumption, the marketing authority would have chosen a different price schedule if it could have prohibited forwardhauling, while the equivalence of the p(x) and p(x) schedules means that there is nothing that forwardhauling helps the marketing authority to achieve.
Linearity.
-If the p(x) were linear in x, they could be implemented without all the cumbersome machinery of state marketing. Specifically, the government can obtain the same results with an appropriately chosen domestic price for exports from the port, p, and domestic price for transport, a, so that p(x) = p -ax. But when will the p(x) calculated from equation (1 1 The ratio of p/p* is a simple monotonic function of the ratio of the revenue that has to be raised, R, to the maximum revenue that could be raised, R max. This formula is used below to obtain some benchmark figures. What about the properties of the optimal combination of the instruments, p and a, that is derived from equations (18a)-(18b) when the production function is of a general form? Clearly, the combination p > p* and a < a* cannot raise a positive level of revenue and is ruled out by R > 0. But more can be said because R > 0 implies that p -ax cannot exceed p* -a*x for every x (i.e., the boundary of cultivation after revenue is raised must lie somewhere within the original boundary of cultivation). This in turn implies that if p > p*, pla must be less than p*la* so that a > a*.
The preceding statements are, however, all that can be made on a priori grounds. Possible policy combinations are (1) p < p*, a < a*, and p/a ! p*/a*; (2) p < p*, a > a*, and pla < p*la*; and (3) p > p*, a > a*, and pla < p*/a*." l The reason is that when technology is not Cobb-Douglas, a combination of p and a can only approximate the optimal p(x) locus of Section IV and may in general do so with p and a in several different relationships to p* and a*, depending on the shape of p(x). On the other hand, there is a strong appeal to the notion that the optimal policy package is an export tax combined with a transport subsidy. By itself, an export tax of a given amount at the port, (p* -p), translates into a higher and higher tax as a percentage of the farm gate price at the road, t(x, 0) (p* -p)/(p* -a*x), as distance from the port increases. There seems to be no inherent reason to expect that it is optimal to increase the tax rate spatially in this way. To offset this pattern requires a transport subsidy. In the CobbDouglas case with its constant elasticity of supply, the intuition is exact and the optimal transport subsidy is such as to equalize the tax rate at the farm gate for the farms at the roadside.
While the optimal policy using p and a is in general only a twoparameter approximation to the first-best optimal p(x) policy, even this class of policies may not be feasible. On the one hand, it is easy to 1 l These cases can all be produced by examining the effect of an increase in R on p, a, and p/a about the equilibrium in which R = 0 and therefore in which p = p*, a = a*, and p/a = p*/a*. To do so, simply totally differentiate eqq. (18a) and (18b) and eq. (13) with R = R to obtain the signs of dpIdR, daldR, and d(pla)/dR and thereby the cases 1-3. imagine situations in which the government chooses not to affect a. For instance, it may not be possible to confine fuel subsidies to transport of the export crop, so that subsidized fuel is diverted to other types of transport as well as perhaps to cooking or other purposes. In this case, the government chooses p by setting equation (1 8b as is p* to the value of a. 15 As (X increases, p rises, as does a when it is used with p; when farmers can also adjust on the intensive margin, revenue-maximizing price interventions must be moderated. When only a is used to maximize revenue, (x is irrelevant, it is only the 16 extensive margin that matters, and a is set at the rather high value of 2a*. Finally, when a is used alone, H1 exceeds Rmax by a good amount (a factor of two), while for the other two problems, Hl < Rrax. Table 2 calculates relative values for two cases of ax, a = 0 and x = 0.5. These results suggest that the solutions to the problems of revenue maximization using p with or without a are quite similar especially for ax = 0.5, and both differ quite markedly from the solutions to this problem when a is used alone. Another way of looking at these differences in instruments, however, is to ask how H would differ when a is and is not used to raise the same R. To do so requires a return to the more general optimal tax problem of raising a given amount of revenue while maximizing private welfare. In particular, for ax = 0 and R = 0.444 (the maximum revenue that can be raised using p alone), equation (1 9b") can be used to calculate p and a when both are used to raise revenue, and thence H from equation (20a). The answers are that p = 0.667p* and H = 0.445. It turns out, therefore, that revenue maximization with p and a is highly nonlinear because a relatively 15 Nor does this result carry over to the maximization of II subject to a revenue constraint; see eqq. (19b)-(19d) . 16 Again, this result does not hold when II is maximized subject to a revenue constraint; see eq. (19c). small decrease in the revenue that is raised from 0.500 to 0.444 results in a very large increase in aggregate rents from 0.250 to 0.445. In other words, the shadow cost of raising additional revenue in terms of aggregate land rents forgone, pL, is rising very steeply as a function of R. Correspondingly, the advantage to farmers of the government's using both p and a to raise revenue of 0.444 in comparison to p alone is considerable because aggregate rents are 0.445 rather than 0.296. These models can also be extended to analyze the benefits from road improvements. The important lesson is that these benefits can be assessed only in conjunction with the tax system. 17 The partial (beneficial) effect of a decrease in a* consequent on an improvement in road 
VI. State Marketing: Discrete Depots
What if the marketing authority is restricted in the number of depots that it can set up so that it does not have full flexibility in implementing a continuum of prices, perhaps because there are fixed costs of setting up a depot? First, if technology is Cobb-Douglas, such state marketing with discrete depots is strictly inferior to an exportation tax coupled with a fuel subsidy (which in turn is equivalent to the firstbest continuum of depots, in this special case). As mentioned, fuel price interventions may, however, themselves be infeasible. The government may be left with p as its only choice among the tax instruments discussed in Section V. A policy of discrete depots may then be worth considering even in the Cobb-Douglas case. Second, with other technologies, a policy of discrete depots may be optimal even when both p and a are available as interventions because it may allow a closer approximation to the first-best p(x). To point up some of the issues involved in a policy of discrete depots as simply as possible, I consider a marketing agency that buys either at the port at price Po or at a depot located on the road XD miles from the port, where it pays a price pI. Farmers transport their output either to the depot or to the port at $b per ton-mile off-road and $a* per ton-mile on the road. The government transports whatever output it buys at the depot to the port at $a* per ton-mile. Technology is Walters's, F = 1, and the goal of the government is to maximize revenue.
I first assume that the government can locate a wall at XB from the port and that all output to the left of XB must go to the port while all output to the right goes to the depot located at XD. This assumption is meant as an expository device and to provide a benchmark, although it is quite possible that the marketing agency actually can ban road transport from the port side of XB to the depot and achieve this outcome.18 Figure 3 In the absence of a restriction such as the wall at XB, farmers near XD but to the port side of the depot will find it more profitable to ship to the depot because at the depot PI > Po -axD. As shown in the second column of table 3, prices do reach a local peak at XD so that the depot is not redundant. In contrast to Section IV, in which prices are continuously varied along the road (a continuum of depots), discrete depots, therefore, do raise the possibility of backhauling. If XB (in fig. 3) 
Numerical solution of these equations (and the discarding of economically irrelevant sets of roots) produces the values given in the third column of table 3. Revenues are reduced relative to the situation with the wall but are still significantly above those achieved with purchase only at the port; setting up a depot has benefits, even when backhauling cannot be stopped. The corresponding expression for revenue using both a and p (or, equivalently, given the assumed production technology, using an infinite number of depots all along the road) is p*3/12a*b. In this case, one depot with backhauling closes almost half the gap in revenue between purchase only at the port and the first-best, that is, (0.0783 -0.0741)/(0.0833 -0.074 1) = 0.457. As a general rule, the existence and extent of backhauling do not in themselves suggest that pricing and marketing intervention by the government is inappropriate. It depends on what the feasible tax and price instruments are, most especially whether an efficient level of fuel subsidies can be implemented in the Cobb-Douglas case, and, more generally, on the cost of a continuum of depots when technology is not Cobb-Douglas and the degree to which the optimal p(x) are well approximated by a p and a policy if feasible.
VII. Panterritorial Pricing
In contrast to the optimal state marketing schemes just discussed, many African governments pursue a policy of panterritorial pricing. 19 They mandate that state marketing agencies pay the same price to all producers, regardless of their location (see Ndulu 1980; Arhin, Hesp, and van der Laan 1985). Application of this theory of panterritorial pricing to the unbounded agricultural area of equal fertility summarized in figure 1 would result in an absurd and unsustainable outcome. Agricultural production would spread limitlessly over the plain. The cost to the marketing agency of transporting all this output to the port would result in its sustaining unbounded losses, and the system would break down. Paying for output at a price p > 0 with the option to abandon it where purchased would have a similar effect.
In practice, the theory of panterritorial pricing might be saved by being limited within national borders or within certain agroclimatic zones outside of which certain crops just cannot be grown. In these cases, these (economically arbitrary) boundaries to the zone of cultivation might allow the marketing agency to pay the same (positive) price to all producers and at least break even. On the other hand, the marketing agency might still confront insupportable losses if it cannot choose an arbitrarily low price. In this situation the marketing agency may be unable or unwilling to get out and purchase from smallholders. It may not have the funding or choose to make the expenditures for trucks and fuel; it may not provide sacks to smallholders to headload their produce to buying depots; it may not purchase output in a timely fashion, so that farmers experience storage losses and interest costs; and it may not pay for produce for which it accepts delivery. All these things seem to be happening in African countries that pursue panterritorial pricing. I do not, however, know of information on the geographical incidence of these breakdowns. One possibility is that breakdowns occur most frequently in outlying areas, so that producers distant from the port receive a lower effective price (consequent on delays in purchase or payment), even if they receive the same price as elsewhere when they are able to sell something. In effect, the marketing agency uses nonprice methods to avoid the losses implied by buying from all producers at a common price, thereby simulating the '9 In the spatial monopoly literature, this is analogous to uniform pricing.
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distance-based pattern of farm gate prices that would be generated by equation (5). In this case, the so-called failures of African marketing agencies may be movements toward the optimum. All these aspects of panterritorial pricing leave scope for a wide range of implementation. One option available to marketing agencies desirous of avoiding the worst effects of panterritorial pricing is to buy from all producers who get output to the road up to a certain distance from the port, z, and to pay these producers the same price, p, at the road. The marketing agency then chooses p and z optimally. To maintain the fiction of panterritorial pricing, other producers may be told that they can sell at p, but the marketing agency just never gets out to buy from them. The situation is illustrated in figure 4. (For ease of calculation, it is assumed that producers beyond the point z do not transport anything to z, which some would in fact find it profitable to do.) In this case aggregate revenues are given by 
WI
For the Cobb-Douglas case, maximizing R produces values for p and z given in table 4. At a = 0, this optimized panterritorial pricing scheme produces the same aggregate revenue as using only p, an export tax at the port.20 For a > 0, however, it always produces less revenue. For all 1 > x-0, this version of panterritorial pricing yields strictly less revenue than maximization with respect to p and a (as is obvious because it imposes a strictly suboptimal pattern on the p(x)). Panterritorial pricing also produces a lower H than export taxation alone or than export taxation plus a fuel subsidy, and so it is inferior on both H and R criteria. In the comparison between the p and a policy and panterritorial pricing, the ratio of the two H's equals that of the two R's. (All these results follow from a comparison of the formulae of table 4 with those of table 2.) 20 With transport by farmers of some output from beyond z to z, maximal revenues with panterritorial pricing would actually exceed those from an export tax (use of p alone) if ax = 0. To realize any of this gain in revenue, however, the government would have to reoptimize with respect to z. The reason is that in the absence of transport from beyond z (the problem of table 4), the optimal z satisfies p* -p -az = 0, and so the government just breaks even on output purchased at z. With a mass of output arriving from beyond z, it is optimal to change z and p, so that positive revenue is made on all output brought to z. 
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VIII. Conclusions
The adoption of an explicitly spatial model of the agricultural sector allows the ranking of a number of price interventions in terms of their effects on government's revenues and the welfare of producers. If agricultural technology is Cobb-Douglas, an export tax combined with a transport subsidy does better than many other tax and state marketing schemes and as well as the best-performing policy of official buying at a continuum of depots. For instance, a numerical example shows that an export tax combined with a transport subsidy can raise the same revenue with much lower deadweight loss than an export tax alone. Various programs that use depots can have a role to play if a transport subsidy is ruled out or if technology is not Cobb-Douglas. Forwardhauling or backhauling may occur when the government uses depots but can also often be ruled out a priori, and in any case it need not preclude the optimality of these policies. A numerical example shows that the use of just two depots rather than one (i.e., an export tax alone) can have a significant impact on the revenue that can be raised.
In addition, such models provide clues about the feasibility of implementing these policies and the costs of administration. Finally, these models point to the importance of an integrated analysis of tax/ price policy and the benefits from transportation investments. There are, however, a considerable number of other topics that are suggested by this framework that I leave as subjects for future research. One set of issues involves the organization of transport. In particular, equation (5) provides a tight link between the price at the port and the farm gate price via the costs of transport. The transport sector may not, however, price its services in this way, and so this link would then be cut. This outcome may arise if transport is not competitively organized, a fear of many African policymakers who favor state marketing.
Another area for further work is the gathering of empirical information on, and testing of, the models. Econometric work on producer behavior and the provision of transportation services is an obvious component to calculations that are more realistic than those provided in this paper. But not all information of value need be econometric; it is also important to know how state marketing agencies implement their mandate. How many depots have been set up, where, and which ones provide reliable marketing services, especially when panterritorial pricing is the ideal?
